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Abstract
The continually rising demand for wireless services and applications in the era of Internet of
things (IoT) and artificial intelligence (AI) presents a significant number of unprecedented challenges
to existing network structures. To meet the rapid growth need of mobile data services, blockchain
radio access network (B-RAN) has emerged as a decentralized, trustworthy radio access paradigm
spurred by blockchain technologies. However, many characteristics of B-RAN remain unclear and hard
to characterize. In this study, we develop an analytical framework to model B-RAN and provide some
basic fundamental analysis. Starting from block generation, we establish a queuing model based on a
time-homogeneous Markov chain. From the queuing model, we evaluate the performance of B-RAN
with respect to latency and security considerations. By connecting latency and security, we uncover a
more comprehensive picture of the achievable performance of B-RAN. Further, we present experimental
results via an innovative prototype and validate the proposed model.
I. INTRODUCTION
The past decade has witnessed tremendous growth in emerging wireless technologies geared toward
diverse applications [1]. Radio access networks (RANs) are becoming more heterogeneous and highly
complex. Without well-designed inter-operation, mobile network operators (MNOs) must rely on their
independent infrastructures and spectra to deliver data, often leading to duplication, redundancy, and
inefficiency. A huge number of currently deployed business or individual access points (APs) have not
been coordinated in the existing architecture of RANs, and are therefore under-utilized. Meanwhile, user
equipments (UEs) are not granted to access to APs of operators other than their own, even though some
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2of them may provide better link quality and economically sensible. The present state of rising traffic
demands coupled with the under-utilization of existing spectra and infrastructure resources motivates the
development of a novel network architecture to integrate multiple parties of service providers (SPs) and
clients to transform the rigid network access paradigm that we face today.
Recently, blockchain has been recognized as a disruptive innovation shockwave [2]–[4]. Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) has been suggested that blockchain may be integrated into wireless
communications for the next-generation network (NGN) in the Mobile World Congress 2018. Along
the same line, the new concept of blockchain radio access network (B-RAN) was formally proposed
and defined in [5]. In a nutshell, B-RAN is a decentralized and secure wireless access paradigm that
leverages the principle of blockchain to multiple trustless networks into a larger shared network and
benefits multiple parties from positive network effects. As revealed in [5], B-RAN can drastically improve
network throughput via cross-network sharing and offloading. Furthermore, the positive network effect can
help B-RAN recruit and attract more players, including network operators, spectral owners, infrastructure
manufacturers, and service clients alike. The subsequent expansion of such a shared network platform
would make the network platform more valuable, thereby generating a positive feedback loop. In time,
a vast number of individual APs can be organized into B-RAN and commodified to form a sizable and
ubiquitous wireless network, which can significantly improve the utility of spectra and infrastructures. In
practice, rights, responsibilities and obligations of each participant in B-RAN can be flexibly codified as
smart contracts executed by blockchain.
Among existing studies on leveraging blockchain in networks, most have focused on Internet of things
(IoT) [6]–[10], cloud/edge computing [11]–[13], wireless sensor networks [14], and other consensus
mechanisms [15], [16]. Only a few considered the future integration of blockchain in wireless commu-
nications. Weiss et al. [17] discussed several potentials of blockchain in spectrum management. Kuo et
al. [18] summarized some critical issues when applying blockchain to wireless networks and pointed out
the versatility of blockchain. Pascale et al. [19] adopted smart contracts as an enabler to achieve service
level agreement (SLA) for access. Kotobi et al. [20] proposed a secure blockchain verification protocol
associated with virtual currency to enable spectrum sharing. Le et al. [21] developed an early prototype
to demonstrate the functionality of B-RAN.
Despite the growing number of papers and heightened interests with respect to blockchain, works
including fundamental analysis are rather limited. A number of critical difficulties remain unsolved. 1)
Existing works have not assessed the impact of decentralization on RANs after introducing blockchain.
Decentralization always comes with a price that should be characterized and quantified. 2) Very few
papers have noticed that service latency will be a crucial debacle for B-RAN as a price of decentralization
3Table I
IMPORTANT VARIABLES IN THE MODELING AND ANALYSIS
Symbols Explanations Symbols Explanations
tak Arrival epoch of request k τ
c
k Required service time of request k
λa Requests arrival rate T a = 1/λa Average inter-arrival time
λb Blocks generation rate T b = 1/λb Average block time
λc Service rate T c = 1/λc Average service time
s Number of access links in the tract N Number of required confirmations
ρ = λ
a
sλc
Traffic intensity β Relative mining rate of an attacker
Φ =
{
λa, λb, λc, s
}
Basic configuration of B-RAN
[19]. Unfortunately, the length of such delay and its controllability are still open issues. 3) Security is
yet another critical aspect of blockchain-based protocols. In particular, alternative history attack, as an
inherent risk of decentralized databases, is always possible, and must be assessed. 4) A proper model
is urgently needed to exploit the characteristics of B-RAN (such as latency and security) and to further
provide insights and guidelines for real-world implementations.
To address the aforementioned open issues, this study aims to establish a framework to concretely
model and evaluate B-RAN. We start from the block generation process and develop an analytical model
to characterize B-RAN behaviors. We shall evaluate the performance in terms of latency and security in
order to present a more comprehensive view of B-RAN. We will verify the efficacy of our model by
building an innovative B-RAN prototype. We summarize our key contributions as follows:
• We clearly define the workflow of B-RAN and develop an original queuing model based on a time-
homogeneous Markov chain. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first known analytical model
for B-RAN.
• From the queuing model, we analytically characterize the system latency of B-RAN and further
derive both upper and lower bounds on B-RAN latency.
• We use the probability of successful attack to define the security level of B-RAN and evaluate
potential factors that influence the security. We further assess the risk by taking the attacker’s strategy
into consideration.
• Based on the modeling and analysis, we uncover an inherent trade-off relationship between security
and latency, and develop an in-depth understanding regarding the achievable performance of B-RAN.
• Finally, we build a B-RAN prototype that can be used comprehensive experiments to validate the
accuracy of our analytical model and results.
We organize this manuscript as follows. Section II presents the B-RAN framework and the prototype.
4Blockchain
…
Authorize
Request
AP1 AP2 AP3 AP4
UE1
UE2
UE3
UE4
UE5
UE6
UE7
UE8
APs belonging to different SPs
Massive UEs supporting diverse applications
Figure 1. Conceptual illustration of self-organized B-RAN.
Section III provides the mining model to describe the block generation process. In Section IV, we establish
the B-RAN queuing model, with which we analyze and evaluate the B-RAN performance concerning
latency and security in Section V and Section VI, respectively. We demonstrate the latency-security trade-
off in Section VII and provide some in-depth insights to B-RAN. Section VIII concludes our manuscript.
Given the large number of symbols to be used, we summarize the important variables in Table I.
II. B-RAN FRAMEWORK
B-RAN can integrate multiple networks across SPs for diverse applications. As illustrated in Fig. 1,
B-RAN is self-organized by APs belonging to multiple SPs, massive UEs, and a blockchain maintained
by miners. In B-RAN, there is a confederacy of SPs (organizations or individuals) that are willing to
provide public wireless access under shared control. These SPs in B-RAN allow the greater pool of UEs
to access their APs and networks by receiving payment or credit for reciprocal services. Blockchain, as
the name suggests, is a chain of interconnected blocks [22], which acts as a public ledger in B-RAN for
recording, confirming, and enforcing digital actions in smart contracts.
Traditional roaming in cellular networks may be viewed as a legacy solution that has poor cost structure.
There has been little incentive for cellular RAN operators to coordinate services and coverages. It is so
challenging to reach mutual agreement on roaming between hundreds of organizational SPs without
relying on a trusted third party, not to include unknown individual SPs. During roaming, UEs are also
required to select an AP from its subscribed operator, even though it may not deliver services of the most
bandwidth-efficient and highest quality in a given environment. With the help of blockchain, B-RAN
5can form an expansive cooperative network of different operators to deliver high quality service at high
spectrum efficiency while protecting the interests of all legal participants at the same time.
A. Access Workflow
Since B-RAN is envisioned to be broadly inter-operative and to support multiple advanced wireless
services and standards. This work focuses on the most basic access approach for which the procedure is
shown in Fig. 2.
• In preparation for access, UEs and SPs should first enter an SLA containing the details including
service types, compensation rates, among other terms. (For example, SPs can first publish their
service quality and charge standard, and UEs select suitable SPs according to the expenditure
and quality of service.) The service terms and fees will be explicitly recorded in a smart contract
authorized by the digital signatures of both sides.
• In step 1, the smart contract with the access request is committed to the mining network and is then
verified by miners.
• In step 2, the verified contracts are assembled into a new block, which is then added at the end of
the chain.
• In step 3, the block is accepted into the main chain after sufficient blocks as confirmations built on
top of it.
• In step 4, the access service is delivered according to the signed smart contract.
Clients can obtain access services more conveniently through the above process instead of signing
contracts with a specific MNO in advance. The service duration in B-RAN is flexible and can be as short
as a few minutes or hours, which is different from typical long-term plans (e.g., monthly plans). Hence,
in B-RAN, mobile devices can access suitable APs belonging to various SPs which likely provide higher
quality coverage for the UEs in their current locations. UEs can prolong access services by renewing the
contract earlier before the previous one expires in order to continue the connection status. Hence, service
latency in this context refers to the delay when a UE accesses an unknown network for the first time,
rather than the delay in the physical layer transmission.
Mathematically, we can describe the request structure by REQk (t
a
k, τ
c
k) shown in Fig. 2, where t
a
k
and τ ck are the arrival epoch and the service duration of request k, respectively. Assume that the access
requests are mutually independent, and arrive as a Poisson process with rate λa. Equivalently, the inter-
arrival time between two requests Ua follows exponential distribution with mean T a = 1/λa. Based on
well-known studies such as [23], the random service time τ ck is also expected to be exponential with mean
T c = 1/λc. Note that in this work, we consider a tract covered by multiple trustless SPs (organizations or
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Figure 2. Four stages of the access workflow in B-RAN.
individuals). The APs belonging to these SPs in the tract are capable of providing access services for at
most s UEs. In other words, s can be viewed as the maximum number of access links in the considered
tract. The block size limit is considered as unlimited when we focus on one tract.
B. Consensus Mechanism
B-RAN, as a decentralized system, requires proper consensus mechanisms for consistency [16], [24].
Proof-of-Work (PoW) has been widely used in practice and proven to be secure in cryptocurrencies such
as Bitcoin. In PoW, network maintainers, also known as miners, need to obtain a hash value below a
given target by repeatedly guessing a random variable named nonce. However, PoW-based consensus
mechanisms consume a tremendous amount of energy, which is likely unbearable for energy-limited
mobile devices. Consequently, Proof-of-Device (PoD) is proposed for B-RAN as a promising alternative
by utilizing the fact that wireless access usually depends on a hardware device associated with a unique
identifier (ID) [5]. PoD deploys unique tamper-proof IDs, such as the international mobile equipment
identity (IMEI) and Identifier for Advertisers (IFA), in order to distinguish different network entities. Also,
due to variations during manufacture, every device has multiple hardware-dependent features, which could
constitute a unique RF fingerprinting for each device and can be identified from the transmitted RF signal
[25]. In the real world, forging an identity of a device is often costly, whereas creating multiple identities
is almost costless in cryptocurrencies. Therefore, PoD can safeguard the security of B-RAN without
expending immense computing power and is thus suitable for wireless networks. Notably, PoW, PoD,
and other alternatives can be put in the same class since all of them are based on hash puzzles. We will
further discuss and model the block generation process of a hash-based consensus mechanism in Section
III.
7C. Implementation
In order to evaluate our established model, we will provide demonstrative experimental results from
a home-built prototype throughout the whole article. We implement this version of B-RAN prototype
on a workstation with Intel Core CPU I7-8700K and 32GB RAM. Our prototype consists of a standard
file system for data storage, a key-value database for file index, and several core modules written in
Python. The prototype supports both PoW and PoD consensus mechanisms and adopts the fast smart
contract deployment (FSCD) [21]. We configure different Ethernet ports as UEs and APs and set up the
integrated development environment (IDE), wherein UEs propose random access requests according to
the input configurations and APs provide services based on the workflow given in Section II-A. During
tests, the prototype can track running statistics and provide them as output results. More details about
the implementation, e.g., the concepts of root contract and contract cache, can be found in [21]. Note
that, in this work, the average service time T c as time unit is set to unity without loss of generality, so
time is measured as relative variables in terms of time unit T c.
III. MINING MODEL
A. Hash-Based Mining
In this section, we will present a general model for hash-based puzzles to describe the block generation
process, also known as mining. Usually, block propagation in networks is much faster than block
generation, and we thus ignore the block spreading delay. We will verify the mining model by using the
real data of Bitcoin and Ethereum.
Generally, a hash puzzle is to find a suitable answer to satisfy the following conditions:
Hash(HP + DP+ TS+ OF) < GT. (1)
Here “HP” stands for the hash pointer to a previous block, “DP” means the data payload, “TS” is the
current timestamp, “GT” represents a given target, and “OF” is the optional field depending on the
specific type of the hash puzzle. For instance, in the PoW protocol, the optional field can be any random
number, whereas, in the PoD protocol, the optional field is given by the hardware ID. In PoW, the range
of the optional field is unlimited. Hence, a miner can guess many times to find a correct nonce, and
hence the number of trials is only restricted by the mining rigs. In PoD, the optional field is given by
the tamper-proof ID such that each device can perform the hash computation only once for each slot,
thereby largely reducing the power consumption. The premise behind that is the entities in real RANs
cannot be effortlessly forged or created. The characteristics, e.g., security level and power consumption,
of different hash-based consensus mechanism can be traded off by properly choosing the optional field.
8Table II
NOTATIONS IN THE MODEL OF MINING.
Symbols Explanations Symbols Explanations
p Success probability of a single hash trial
m Number of hash trials τ Length of time conducted m trials
W b Number of failures preceding the first success Ub Continuous time preceding the first success
λb = mp
τ
Mean number of successes per unit time (success rate) T b = 1
λb
Average block time
B(n, t, t+ h) Event that n blocks occur in the interval (t, t+ h) β Relative mining rate of an attacker
B. Modeling of Hash Trials
For a general hash-based mining process, each hash trial can be regarded as an independent Bernoulli
experiment with success probability p as the timestamp keeps changing. In a sequence of independent
Bernoulli trials, the probability that the first block is generated after exactly m failures is (1− p)m p.
Let W b be the number of failures preceding the first success. Then, W b follows geometric distribution:
Pr
{
W b = m
}
= (1− p)m p, m = 0, 1, ... (2)
Also, the probability that the number of trials preceding the first success is at least m equals
Pr
{
W b ≥ m
}
= (1− p)m , m = 0, 1, ... (3)
Here,W b can be viewed as the waiting period before a block is successfully generated, and its distribution
can be described by (2) and (3). The average number of successes in m independent trials is mp.
Hence, if m hash trials are conducted in a time interval of length τ , then the success rate defined as
the mean number of successes per unit time is λb = mp/τ . Now let p → 0 and m → ∞ in the way
that keeps λb constant. We can visualize an experiment with infinite hash trials performed within interval
τ . Successive trials are infinitesimally close with vanishingly small probability of success, but the mean
number of successes remains a non-zero constant λbτ . By using the fact that the geometric distribution
approaches the exponential distribution in the limit, we have
lim
m→∞
(1− p)m |
p=λ
bτ
m
= lim
m→∞
(
1−
λbτ
m
)m
= exp(−λbτ). (4)
Define a random variable U b as the continuous time before preceding the first success. Since p = λ
bτ
m ,
then we have
Pr
{
U b > τ
}
= Pr
{
W b > m
}
= exp(−λbτ). (5)
U b is also named as the block time in the context of blockchain. The average block time, denoted by T b,
is equal to 1/λb according to (5). λb is thus called as the mining rate representing the block generation
rate.
9(4) and (5) imply that, if the number of hash computations of the whole network in a unit time tends to
infinity, then the length of time between two successive blocks, i.e., U b’s, would follow the exponential
distribution. Interestingly, most of mature PoW blockchain networks indeed perform a huge number
of hash computations every moment. For example, the minimum hash rates of bitcoin and Ethereum
during 2018 are 14,891 TH/s and 159TH/s1. These are humongous numbers in real world, and practically
support the limiting condition that the number of trials tends to infinity. When there are massive hardware
devices participating in mining, the condition also holds for PoD. Note that the block times U b’s are
always mutually independent and identically distributed because of the memoryless property of geometric
distribution, even if the exponential approximation no longer holds.
Now we further prove that blocks generate form a Poisson process. Let B(n, t, t+h) denote the event
that n blocks are generated in interval (t, t + h). As h → 0, the probability that at least one block will
is generated in (t, t+ h) is
Pr {B(n ≥ 1, t, t+ h)} = 1− Pr {B(n = 0, t, t + h)} = 1− Pr
{
U b > h
}
= 1− exp(−λbh) = λbh+ o(h), h→ 0.
We note that o(h) is an infinitesimal of higher order such that limh→0 o(h)/h = 0. The probability that
exactly one block will occur in (t, t+ h) is
Pr {B(n = 1, t, t+ h)} =
∫ h
0
Pr
{
U b1 = h− u
}
Pr
{
U b2 > u
}
du
=
∫ h
0
λb exp(−λb(h− u)) exp(−λbu)du
= λbh exp(−λbh) = λbh+ o(h), h→ 0,
where U b1 and U
b
2 represent the generation times of first and second blocks since the epoch t. As h→ 0,
the probability of occurrence of two or more blocks in (t, t+ h) is
Pr {B(n ≥ 2, t, t + h)} = 1− exp(−λbh)− λbh exp(−λbh) = o(h), h→ 0.
In conclusion, the block generation can be modeled as a Poisson process with mining rate λb. The
notations in this section are summarized in Table II.
In Prototype Verification A, we illustrate the model validity of Poisson in Fig. 3 by empirical data. In
our self-built B-RAN prototype described in Fig. 3(a), we deploy five miners with equal mining rates and
set the block generation rate to λb = 1/10, or equivalently the average block time T b = 1/λb = 10. We
measure the block time for 10,000 blocks and plot the histogram to approximate the distribution of block
1Source: bitinfocharts.com/, accessed Nov., 2019.
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Figure 3. The distribution of block time from real data and simulations. (Please see footnotes 2 and 3 for sources.) (a) Self-built
B-RAN prototype. (b) Bitcoin. (c) Ethereum.
time U b. One can see that the Poisson model closely fits the data. Furthermore, we collected the empirical
data from Bitcoin (51,036 blocks starting at height 530,1142) and Ethereum (2,078,000 blocks starting
at height 5,806,2893), respectively, to demonstrate the validity of the model in practice. The collected
Bitcoin and Ethereum data are also consistent with the model in a real network where propagation delay
does exist. Furthermore, the measured average block times of both Bitcoin and Ethereum are close to the
block times predefined by protocols. Therefore, even though the propagation delay is simply neglected,
the Poisson model can still well characterize the block generation process in practice.
C. Attacker’s Model
In this part, we consider an adversary who mounts an alternative history attack by attempting to generate
a longer fraudulent block chain. The adversarial has to generate new blocks in the same way as honest
miners since the hash value can hardly be tampered. Hence, the fraudulent blocks are also generated as
Poisson. Now assume that the mining rate of the attacker is βλb, while the mining rate of honest miners
is λb, i.e., the attacker controls β1+β fraction of hash power
4. Both the attacker and the benign network
are mining independently. From the additive property of Poisson processes, the sum generation rate of
both benign and fraudulent block is (β + 1)λb. Note that, in an alternative history attack, the attacker
will not publish the fraudulent chain until it creates a more extended branch. Consequently, the benign
participants of B-RAN are unaware of the existence of the attacker, and can only observe the blocks
2Source: www.blockchain.com/en/btc/blocks/, accessed Nov., 2019.
3Source: etherscan.io/block/, accessed Nov., 2019.
4Usually, an attacker can hardly amass more hash power than the sum of other honest miners, i.e., β < 1; Otherwise, the
attacker already dominates the mining network.
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generated by honest miners with the generation rate λb until a fraud succeeds. We will provide a detailed
procedure of the alternative history attack in Section VII.
IV. B-RAN QUEUING MODEL
According to the B-RAN framework in Section II, we divide the service process of a valid request into
four stages: 1) waiting to be included into a block; 2) waiting for confirmations; 3) waiting for service;
4) in service. Naturally, we can model the process using several queues in tandem based on the four
phases. However, it is worth pointing out that, in the third stage, the requests in the same block arrive
simultaneously, and the number of requests is related to the block generation time U b. Hence, this queue
is non-Markovian since some previous events (e.g., U b) beside the current state of the queue may affect
its future state. Usually, a non-Markovian queue is difficult to tackle. Therefore, we should carefully
select the state space of B-RAN for further analysis.
Let in be the number of pending requests that already have n confirmations. A pending request is con-
firmed after received N confirmations. Then j =
∑+∞
n=N in denotes as the number of confirmed requests
that have not been served yet. In this approach, B-RAN can be fully identified by state E(i0, i1, ..., iN−1, j)
belonging to the (N + 1)-dimensional state space ZN+1+ , where Z
N+1
+ represents the set of all (N + 1)-
tuples of non-negative integers. Formally, the queuing process of B-RAN can be completely described
by a vector stochastic process as follows:
{X(t) ∈ ZN+1+ , t ≥ 0}.
B-RAN is said to be in state E(i0, i1, ..., iN−1, j) at time t if X(t) = E(i0, i1, ..., iN−1, j). Note that
the way to establish a queuing model is not unique. We define B-RAN by using the queuing model
{X(t), t ≥ 0} owing to two critical properties, as shown in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. The queuing model {X(t), t ≥ 0} is a continuous time-homogeneous Markov process with
properties:
1) Markov:
Pr
{
X(t+ h) = E|X(t) = E′,X(u) for 0 ≤ u ≤ t
}
= Pr
{
X(t+ h) = E|X(t) = E′
}
;
2) Time homogeneity:
Pr
{
X(t+ h) = E|X(t) = E′
}
= Pr
{
X(t) = E|X(0) = E′
}
.
Proof. Recall that, as claimed in Section II, requests arrival according to a Poisson process with rate
λa, and the service times are exponentially distributed with mean 1/λc, independently of each other.
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Figure 4. State transition graph of E (i0, i1, ..., iN−1, j).
According to the mining model in Section III, the block generation is a Poisson process with rate λb.
In a nutshell, request inter-arrival times Ua, block times U b, and service times U c are exponential with
mean 1/λa, 1/λb, and 1/λc, respectively, and independent of each other.
The exponential service times U c imply that if there are j UEs in service, the rate at which service
completions occur is jλc. To show this, suppose that U c1 , U
c
2 , ..., U
c
j are the duration of j i.i.d. expo-
nential simultaneously running time intervals with mean 1/λc. Let U cmin = min
{
U c1 , U
c
2 , ..., U
c
j
}
be the
minimum service time. Observe that U cmin will exceed u if and only if all U
c
j exceed u. Hence,
Pr {U cmin > u} = Pr {U
c
1 > u} · Pr {U
c
2 > u} · · · Pr
{
U cj > u
}
= exp (−jλcu) .
Only those UEs that are in service can possibly leave. Hence, the service completion rate with j
simultaneous services is jλc for 0 ≤ j ≤ s. Since at most s UEs can be in service simultaneously,
obviously the service completion rate is at most sλc. Hence, we denote
λcj = min(j, s) · λ
c (6)
to represent the service completion rate of B-RAN compactly.
Similarly, the time until the next event (an request arrival, a block generation, or a service completion)
is also exponentially distributed with rate (λa+λb+λcj). The probability that an event occurs in (t, t+h)
is 1 − exp
(
−
(
λa + λb + λcj
)
h
)
, which tends to
(
λa + λb + λcj
)
h + o(h) as h → 0. The length of
time required for the event to occur and the type of the event are independent. There are several possible
changes to a state. If a new request arrives, the state of B-RAN will switch from E′ (i0, i1, ..., iN−1, j)
to E (i0 + 1, i1, ..., iN−1, j). The probability that a new request arrives in (t, t+ h) is
Pr
{
X(t+ h) = E (i0 + 1, i1, ..., iN−1, j) |X(t) = E
′ (i0, i1, ..., iN−1, j)
}
(7)
=
λa
λa + λb + λcj
((
λa + λb + λcj
)
h+ o(h)
)
= λah+ o(h), (h→ 0).
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If a new block is generated, all existing blocks will get one more confirmation, and the state of B-
RAN will move from E′ (i0, i1, ..., iN−1, j) to E (0, i0, i1, ..., iN−1 + j). The probability that a block is
generated in (t, t+ h) can be found to satisfy
lim
h→0
Pr
{
X(t+ h) = E (0, i0, i1, ..., iN−1 + j) |X(t) = E
′ (i0, i1, ..., iN−1, j)
}
= λbh+ o(h). (8)
If an access service is ended (j ≥ 1 at this instant), the state of B-RAN will switch from E′ (i0, i1, ..., iN−1, j)
to E (i0, i1, ..., iN−1, j − 1). The probability that a service completion occurs in (t, t+ h) is
lim
h→0
Pr
{
X(t+ h) = E (i0, i1, ..., iN−1, j − 1) |X(t) = E
′ (i0, i1, ..., iN−1, j)
}
= λcjh+ o(h). (9)
The probability that no event occurs in (t, t+ h) is given by
lim
h→0
Pr {X(t+ h) = X(t)} = 1− (λa + λb + λcj)h+ o(h). (10)
The probability that more than one event occurs in (t, t+ h) is o(h) as h→ 0.
Now we have obtained the transition probabilities Pr{X(t+ h) = E|X(t) = E′} for any possible E
and E′ in the state space. Observe that the transition probabilities are irrelevant to the starting time t,
which indicates that {X(t), t ≥ 0} is homogeneous in time. Moreover, the transition probabilities are
independent of the states of previous moments, which implies the Markov property. Therefore, we have
proven that {X(t), t ≥ 0} is a time-homogeneous Markov process.
Although the queuing model established by Theorem 1 is a vector stochastic process with possibly high
dimensions, we would like to emphasize that such a queuing model is more tractable than the original
non-Markovian process. According to Theorem 1, we can directly obtain the transition probabilities,
given by Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. The queuing model {X(t), t ≥ 0} can be characterized by the transition probabilities
Pr{X(h) = E|X(0) = E′}. The cases with non-zero transition probabilities are covered by (7)-(10),
and probabilities of the rest equal zeros.
Fig. 4 can demonstrate the transition relationships in the result of Corollary 1, though the case of
j = 0 is slightly different. According to Corollary 1, the basic elements
{
λa, λb, λc, s
}
and the number
of confirmationsN are enough to determine the transition probabilities and thus characterize the behaviors
of B-RAN. Hence, we introduce a 4-tuple Φ =
{
λa, λb, λc, s
}
as basic configurations to describe B-RAN.
In the following sections, we will look at B-RAN and analyze it from a deeper view in more dimensions.
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Figure 6. States E(i, j) rearrangement into a row.
V. LATENCY ANALYSIS OF B-RAN
A. Steady-State Analysis
Now we have thus far modeled the B-RAN as a time-homogeneous Markov process with (N + 1) di-
mensions. However, the dimensionality of the state space results in a complex probability transition graph
and is difficult to analyze in general. In the section, we will analyze access service latency of B-RAN by
starting from a relatively simple one-confirmation case (i.e., only one confirmation is required to confirm
a request). In other words, a request is confirmed, as long as it is assembled into a block. In the one-
confirmation case, the queuing model is presented by {X(t) = E(i0, j), t ≥ 0}. We drop the subscript
of i0 for notational simplicity. State E(i, j) means that i pending requests are waiting for assembling
into a block and j confirmed requests are waiting for service. Define wi,j(t) = Pr {X(t) = E(i, j)} as
the probability of the queue in state E(i, j) at time t. Now let us investigate the transition probabilities
during time h with the help of Corollary 1. By comparing the state of B-RAN at time t+ h with that at
time t, for all i = 1, 2, ... and j = 0, 1, 2, ..., we have
wi,j(t+ h)− wi,j(t) = wi−1,j(t)λ
ah+ wi,j+1(t)λ
c
j+1h−wi,j(t)
(
λa + λb + λcj
)
h,
where λcj is defined by (6). By letting h→ 0, we get the following differential-difference equation:
d
dt
wi,j(t) = wi−1,j(t)λa + wi,j+1(t)λ
c
j+1 − wi,j(t)
(
λa + λb + λ
c
j
)
.
Let {wi,j} be the steady-state distribution of B-RAN. The equilibrium condition
d
dtwi,j(t) = 0 yields
wi+1,jλa + wi,j+1λ
c
j+1 − wi,j
(
λa + λb + λ
c
j
)
= 0. (11)
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For the boundary cases (i = 0), we have
w1,0λ
c
1 − w0,0λ
a = 0, (12)(
j∑
ℓ=1
wℓ,j−ℓ
)
λb +w0,j+1λ
c
j+1 − w0,j
(
λa + λ
c
j
)
= 0, ∀j = 0, 1, 2, ... (13)
The differential-difference equations (11)-(13) are known as the forward Kolmogorov equations [26]. We
illustrate the state transition relationships with one confirmation in Fig. 5.
In order to present the forward Kolmogorov equations in a compact form, we rearrange the two-
dimension states {wi,j} by a particular order as shown in Fig. 6, captured by the probability vector:
w =
[
w0,0 w1,0 w0,1 w2,0 w1,1 w0,2 · · ·
]T
.
Now the forward Kolmogorov equations can be rewritten in a matrix form:
Qw = 0, (14)
where Q is known as the infinitesimal generator, or transition rate matrix:
Q =


−λa λc1 · · ·
λa −
(
λa + λb
)
λc1 · · ·
λb − (λa + λc1) λ
c
2 · · ·
λa −
(
λa + λb
)
· · ·
λa −
(
λa + λb + λc1
)
· · ·
λb λb − (λa + λc2) · · ·
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . .


.
(15)
The entry in Q equals to the corresponding transition rate given by ddhPr {X(h) = E|X(0) = E
′} only
depending on the B-RAN configuration tuple Φ =
{
λa, λb, λc, s
}
. We can numerically solve the matrix
equation by combining with the sum probability condition of 1Tw = 1, i.e.,
 Q
1T

w =

 0
1

 . (16)
From (16), the steady-state distribution w(Φ) can be expressed as an implicit function of Φ. Note that
the waiting space of B-RAN has no maximum limit. The number of states, i.e., the dimensions of the
vector w, should be infinite. In numerical calculations, we can use the solution with large enough but
finite dimensions to approximate the infinite-dimension one. However, in practice the number of UEs
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Figure 7. The distribution of steady states under different traffic intensities and block time with s = 4 links. (a) T b = 0.04T c
under low traffic intensity ρ = 0.1. (b) T b = 0.04T c under medium traffic intensity ρ = 0.4. (c) T b = 0.04T c under high
traffic intensity ρ = 0.7. (d) T b = 0.2T c under low traffic intensity ρ = 0.1. (e) T b = 0.2T c under medium traffic intensity
ρ = 0.4. (f) T b = 0.2T c under high traffic intensity ρ = 0.7.
in a tract cannot be infinite, either. The aggressive load λa is required to be less than λc by the stable
condition.
We can obtain the steady-state distribution of B-RAN via (16). Meanwhile, we use our self-built
prototype to measure the sojourn time of each state and estimate the probability of a state. The results show
that analytical steady distributions are highly consistent with experimental outcomes, thereby validating
our established queuing model. We illustrate the steady-state distributions of B-RAN with different T b
and different traffic intensities ρ = λ
a
sλc in Fig. 7. The low, medium and high traffic intensities ρ =
λa
sλc
are set to 0.1, 0.4 and 0.7, respectively. Each node represents E(i, j) in the figures. The results show that,
on the one hand, under a higher traffic intensity, there are more confirmed requests waiting for service.
On the other hand, when the block time T b becomes larger, more requests wait to be assembled into a
block.
To analyze the average latency in B-RAN, we consider the limiting distribution w(Φ), from which we
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can obtain the average number of waiting requests N (Φ) in B-RAN:
E {N (Φ)} =
∑
i,j
(i+ j) · wi,j (Φ) . (17)
We can apply the Little’s Law [23] as a bridge to connect the expected queue length and the average
latency. The Little’s Law states that, in a stable system, the average number of items is equal to the
arrival rate multiplied by the average time an item spends in the system. Hence, the expected sojourn
time Ls (N,Φ) is the sum of waiting time and service time (all the four stages of the workflow), and the
expression of expected sojourn time in the one-confirmation case is given by:
Ls (N = 1,Φ) = E {N (Φ)} /λ
a = T a
∑
i,j
(i+ j)wi,j (Φ) . (18)
According to Section II, the expected service time is T c. Thus, the average latency L (N,Φ) is defined as
the expected waiting time (the first three stages). In the one-confirmation case, L (N,Φ) can be written
as5
L (N = 1,Φ) = T a
∑
i,j
(i+ j)wi,j (Φ)− T
c. (19)
(19) gives the average latency with one confirmation in terms of the limiting distribution in (14).
However, (19) only applies the one-confirmation special case. Our goal is to investigate the general
N -confirmation problem. It is difficult to directly analyze a queue with (N + 1)-dimensional state space,
mainly due to the excessively large number variables in solving the equilibrium equations (14). Recall
that we are more interested in the average system latency. A request, once assembled into a block, is
required to wait for N − 1 confirmations after the very first confirmation of assembling into a block.
This waiting period is an additional stage compared to the one-confirmation case. The additional N − 1
confirmations correspond to extra waiting time of N − 1 independent block time U bn. Hence, the average
access latency is given by
L (N,Φ) = L (1,Φ) + E
{
N∑
n=2
U bn
}
= T a
∑
i,j
(i+ j)wi,j (Φ) + T
b (N − 1)− T c. (20)
Despite the implicit expression of wi,j (Φ), one can see that latency L (N,Φ) grows linearly with the
number of confirmations N . Each extra confirmation leads to T b longer waiting time on average, and
fewer confirmations will effectively reduce service latency. Note that we cannot simply conclude that
5Another equivalent expression of expected latency is L (N = 1,Φ) = T a
∑
i,j
(
i+ (j − 1)+
)
wi,j (Φ), where (·)
+ =
max {·, 0}.
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Figure 9. The impact of the maximal access channels s on
service latency (N = 2 and λb = 25).
latency is linear in T b, because T b will influence the limiting distribution wi,j (Φ), which in turn also
affects latency. For large N , however, we can conclude that latency is quasi-linear in T b.
In Prototype Verification B, we compare the analytical results of (20) with the outcomes from our
B-RAN prototype under different settings of N and λb. Fig. 8 shows both the average and the 95%
confidence interval of latency under different traffic intensities. In the figure, service latency is presented
relative to (r.t.) the service time Tc. First, the experimental results are highly consistent with the analysis
of (20). Basically, higher traffic intensity will lead to longer service latency. Furthermore, the results
show a strong linear relationship between latency L (N,Φ) and confirmation number N , for which the
linear slope is close to T b. This conclusion holds for different traffic intensities and is a simple corollary
of (20): each extra confirmation leads to exactly T b longer waiting time on average.
Moreover, we can assess the impact of s on the average latency by Fig. 9. Given N = 2 and λb = 25,
as the number of access links s increases, the average service latency L (N,Φ) becomes shorter, especially
for the high-intensity case. This result implies that a more extensively formed B-RAN is less likely to
be congested under a constant traffic ρ = λ
a
sλc . B-RAN through inter-operative network integration and
coordination can benefit from the economy of scale by delivering shorter and jointly becomes more
valuable. This remarkable insight strongly motivates the future development of B-RAN.
B. Bounds on Latency
Although we have an accurate queuing model {X(t), t ≥ 0} for B-RAN, the relationship between
latency in (20) and B-RAN parameters Φ remains unspecified. Here we reveal the impact of key
parameters on the B-RAN latency by deriving tight bounds.
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We first investigate the upper bound of latency by introducing an extra constraint that each block can
carry at most one request. The ultra-small block size constraint largely affects network throughput but can
effectively simplify the queuing process. For the one-confirmation case, requests are separately organized
into different blocks. Requests and blocks arrive as a Poisson Process with rate λa and λb, respectively.
Hence, the assembling process becomes an M/M/1 queue with arrival rate λa and service rate λb. After
being assembled into blocks, requests get confirmed and wait for service, effectively forming an M/M/s
queue. Hence, by introduced the block size limit, the whole process is divided into two queues in tandem
and can be analyzed separately.
Given arrival rate λ and service rate µ, the average waiting time of an M/M/1 queue is 1µ−λ [23].
However, the latency of an M/M/s queue is relatively complex, captured by a known lemma in Chapter
3.4 of [23] as follows:
Lemma 1. Given arrival rate λ and service rate µ, the average waiting time of an M/M/s system is
given by
C(s,λ/µ)
sµ−λ +
1
µ , where C(s, λ/µ) is the Erlang C formula expressed as
C(s, λ/µ) =
(λ/µ)s
s!
s
s−λ/µ
(λ/µ)s
s!
s
s−λ/µ +
s−1∑
i=0
(λ/µ)i
i!
.
In the N -confirmation case, we should take the additional confirmation latency N−1λb into account. The
overall latency experienced by a request aggregates the four stages shown in Fig. 2. Consequently, under
the block size limit, the system latency is upper bounded by
Lub (N,Φ) =
1
λb − λa
+
C(s, λa/λc)
sλc − λa
+
N − 1
λb
. (21)
In practice, the block size limit is always much greater than one, and apparently, the obtained bound
Lub (N,Φ) is much longer than the actual latency. Note that Lub (N,Φ) is available if only λ
b > λa.
Otherwise, the length of the first stage (i.e., the M/M/1 queue) will grow without limits and Lub (N,Φ)
would tend to infinity.
To derive the lower bound of latency, consider that blocks are rapidly generated such that a request is
assembled into a block immediately upon its arrival. As a result, the queuing process with one confirmation
is directly reduced to only an M/M/s queue. By considering confirmation latency, we obtain an lower
bound of service latency:
Llb1 (N,Φ) =
C(s, λa/λc)
sλc − λa
+
N − 1
λb
. (22)
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The gap between Llb1 (N,Φ) and Lub (N,Φ) equals
1
λb−λa , which is negligible for
1
λb−λa → 0. Therefore,
in this case of λb ≫ λa or more accurately λb − λa →∞, we can say both Llb1 (N,Φ) and Lub (N,Φ)
are quite tight in terms of latency.
Moreover, we can obtain another lower bound by estimating how long it takes to assemble a request
into a block. As shown in Section V-A, the closed-form distribution of E (i, j) is intractable. However, it
is possible to deal with the distribution of i in state E (i, j). We can sketch the state space diagram of the
number of pending requests i, and then it forms a typical M/M/∞ queue with arrival rate λa and service
rate λb. By formulating the forward Kolmogorov equations, we can obtain the limiting distribution as
Pr {X(t) = E(i, ·)} =
λb
λa + λb
·
(
λa
λa + λb
)i
.
According to the Little’s Law, the mean waiting time for assembling is 1/λb. By simply neglecting the
waiting time for service (Phase 3), we can attain another lower bound of latency:
Llb2 (N,Φ) =
1
λb
+
N − 1
λb
=
N
λb
. (23)
Since the waiting time for service (phase 3) to devise Llb2 (N,Φ) is neglected, the second lower bound
can be regarded as an extreme case under an ultra-light traffic intensity. This is the case when the request
arrival rate λa is extremely small such that there always exist idle access links, in which case the confirmed
requests no longer have to wait for service. Thus, Llb2 (N,Φ) becomes tight as λ
a → 0. Observe that the
arrival rate λa does not appear in the expression of Llb2 (N,Φ), indicating that Llb2 (N,Φ) is a unified
bound for different arrival rates and could be a bit loose in some cases.
In Prototype Verification C, we would like to evaluate the accuracy of the queuing model and the
bounds through experimental results. We set the maximum number of access links to s = 25 and obtain
average and 95% confidence interval of service latency for different system setups Φ, as shown in Fig. 10.
From the results in Fig. 10, we see that the queuing model established in our work accurately predicted
the experimental results. When the traffic intensity is less than 12 , the average latency is dominated by
the confirmation delay (NT b). When the traffic intensity becomes larger, the network congest occurs and
leads to a much longer delay. We also provided the upper and lower bounds in Fig. 10. It is clear that
both upper and lower bounds can help estimate the range of latency. At low traffic intensity, the average
service latency is close to the lower bound Llb2 (N,Φ), where the service latency is dominated by the
confirmation delay, as discussed in Section V-B. From Fig. 10(b), since λb is much larger than λa, we
can see that Lub (N,Φ) and Llb1 (N,Φ) become much tighter.
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Figure 10. The analytical and experimental latency with upper and lower bounds under different traffic intensities ρ (s = 25).
(a) λb = 25 and N = 3. (b) λb = 100 and N = 1.
VI. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Alternative History Attack
Since B-RAN is a distributed radio access network enabled by blockchains, which do elicit certain se-
curity concerns and risks. There can be a variety of vulnerabilities and security implications in blockchain
systems. The alternative history attack, also referred to as “double spending attack”, is a fundamental
and inherent risk of distributed systems [2], [27].
The alternative history attack implies that the history record in blockchain could be tampered by
malicious miners, which essentially exposes the vulnerability of blockchain. In alternative history attack,
an attacker privately mines an alternative blockchain fork in which a fraudulent double spending event
(e.g., an access service in B-RAN) is included. After the network accepts a benign chain, the attacker
releases the fraudulent fork. If the fraudulent fork eventually becomes longer than the benign one,
the attacker can successfully alter a confirmed history and spend the same coin (credit) twice, which
would drive the blockchain system into a catastrophic inconsistent state. For wireless network, altering a
confirmed chain in B-RAN may lead to interference issues when more than one UEs attempt to access
the same channel simultaneously. Hence, alternative history attack cannot be simply ignored, despite the
difference transactions between B-RAN and cryptocurrencies. In our security considerations, we focus
mainly on the risk of alternative history attacks.
For blockchain to overcome alternative history attack, miners are always guided to the “longest”
locally known fork, that is, the one involving the highest amount of computational effort so far. The
block generation process is coupled to some specific capability of miners, e.g., computational power
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Figure 11. The attacker’s scheme in a double spending attack.
in PoW and the number of available devices in PoD. Still, alternative history attacks are possible, and
only require adversaries to create a chain longer than the benign one. Clearly, the higher the number of
confirmations, the lower the probability of a successful alternative history attack.
B. Probability of Successful Attack
Recall that the benign miners’ and an attacker’s mining rate are λb and βλb, respectively, as β represents
the attacker’s relative hash power. Rational benign miners always work on the longest chain for the mining
rewards, while the attacker attempts to generate a fraudulent fork to revise the history for double spending
or other purposes. Before initiating a fraud, the attacker will broadcast a regular event (e.g., paying for
access) and wait for it to be assembled into a block. That block is the recorded history which the attacker
attempts to revise. As shown in Fig. 11, the attacker will mount an alternative history attack according
to the following steps:
1) secretly mine on a fork excluding the attacked block;
2) wait until the attacked block receives enough confirmations (say, N blocks);
3) broadcast the respective blocks as soon as the fraudulent fork is longer than the benign fork.
Note that the attacker could always mine on the fraudulent chain, despiting being many blocks behind.
In practice, the attacker usually will stop working on the fraudulent chain and give up if it is, e.g., Ng
blocks, behind.
Given the attacker’s relative mining rate β and its strategy Ng, we would like to determine the
probability of a successful alternative history attack, donated by S {N,β,Ng}, to reflect how secure
B-RAN is.
Theorem 2. Given the attacker’s relative mining rate β and the give-up strategy Ng, the probability of
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a successful alternative history attack is
S (N,β,Ng) =


1−
∑N
n=0
(
n+N−1
n
) (
1
1+β
)N (
β
1+β
)n (
1−βN−n+1
1−βNg+1
)
if β 6= 1
1−
∑N
n=0
1
2N+n
(
n+N−1
n
) (
N−n+1
Ng+1
)
if β = 1.
(24)
Proof. Please see Appendix A.
A more powerful attacker with a larger β is more likely to revise history successfully, while more
confirmations can effectively mitigate the risk of such malicious attacks. However, no matter how large
N is, the alternative history attack is always possible if the attacker has a non-negative mining rate and
sufficient luck. We note that the attacker’s give-up parameter Ng has never been characterized in the
existing studies, which, in fact, cannot be simply ignored. Based on Theorem 2, we further consider the
impact of Ng on the success probability.
Corollary 2. Given N and β, the probability of a successful attack S (N,β,Ng) increases monotonically
with Ng. Hence, the maximum success probability is S (N,β) = limNg→∞ S (N,β,Ng), given by
S (N,β) =


1−
∑N
n=0
(
n+N−1
n
) (
1
1+β
)N (
β
1+β
)n (
1− βN−n+1
)
if β < 1
1 if β ≥ 1.
(25)
Proof. Please see Appendix B.
Corollary 2 intuitively indicates that the attacker can increase the success probability through repeated
trials. Hence, S (N,β) is the maximum probability of an alternative history attack. The dominant strategy
of a powerful attacker with β ≥ 1 is to never quit. Because S (N,β) = 1 for β > 1, the fraud would
succeed eventually. This is known as the “51%” attack or Goldfinger attack [2]. For weaker hash power
β < 1, although a larger Ng can also increase the success probability, it costs a vast number of resources
and could possibly lead to negative yields. If the fraudulent chain is hundreds of blocks behind the
benign chain, a rational attacker should give up and mount a new round of attack instead of sticking to
the original one with mounting cost.
We would like to point out why our result differs from the existing studies. The original Bitcoin paper
[22] claimed that Y follows a Poisson distribution, which is actually inaccurate. In [2], authors counted
the breakeven case in computing the probability of successful attack. Authors of [2], [28] assumed that
the attacker can pre-mine a block before mount an attack. Clearly, the existing works relied on less
realistic assumptions. Our results further reveal the impact of the attacker’s strategy (Ng), and therefore
is more practical compared to the existing studies.
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Figure 12. The analytical and experimental probability of
success attack for different β and N with Ng =∞.
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Figure 13. The impact of the attacker’s strategy Ng on the
probability of an alternative history attack.
In Prototype Verification D, we now show the security performance of B-RAN obtained from our
home-built prototype. From Fig. 12, one can see clearly that the experiment results firmly agree with
our analytical probability of Theorem 2. As the relative mining rate β increases, the probability of a
successful attack rises significantly. The chain is more secure if it is safeguarded by more confirmations,
which suggests that the number of confirmations N can effectively reduce the risk.
In Fig. 13, we illustrate that the attacker’s threshold Ng can also affect the success probability,
especially for β close to 1. An attacker can increase the success probability by continued attempts,
which, although, expends more mining energy. For β > 1, the 51% attack would eventually succeed,
and thus the dominant strategy for a powerful attacker should be to use Ng =∞. According to Fig. 13,
S (N,β) = S (N,β,Ng =∞) serves as an upper bound of the success probability, which corroborates
Corollary 2. In practice, we can use the upper bound S (N,β) to estimate the security level of B-RAN.
VII. LATENCY-SECURITY TRADE-OFF
From the above analysis, we discover that there exists an inherent relation between latency and security.
This latency-security relationship and design trade-off capture a more complete picture on achievable
performance of B-RAN. We formally state this design trade-off as the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The trade-off between latency and security is given by the piecewise-linear function con-
necting the points (L (N,Φ) ,S (N,β)) for N = 1, 2, ..., where L (N,Φ) and S (N,β) is given by (20)
and (25), respectively.
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Figure 14. The latency-security trade-off (s = 25 and T b = 0.04). (a) Under different traffic intensity ρ and β = 0.2. (b) An
attacker with different mining rate β and ρ = 0.1.
Given the network setting Φ and the attacker’s relative hash power β, the performance of B-RAN can
be thoroughly evaluated by the trade-off specified Theorem 3. The latency-security trade-off can be used
as a new performance metric to characterize B-RAN. Theorem 3 indicates that, more confirmations N
can effectively safeguard the security of B-RAN S (N,β), but would unfortunately increase the access
delay L (N,Φ). Conversely, fewer confirmations to verify a request can considerably reduce latency while
suffering higher risk from an adversary.
Fig. 14 graphically illustrates the trade-off curve (L (N,Φ) ,S (N,β)). Essentially, the latency-security
trade-off is between the convergence rate and confirmation error probability of a distributed system.
Enhancing the security advantage comes at a price of longer access delay, whereas latency reduction
comes at a price of security. Theorem 3 provides the achievable region of B-RAN for given network
parameters Φ and the attacker’s power β. The trade-off provides a more in-depth and complete view of
B-RAN than just staring at latency or security.
Theorem 3 also makes another informative statement. If the network condition Φ becomes better, e.g.,
with less traffic load λa, then the entire trade-off curve will be shifted to the left along the axis of latency
for the same security level. If the attacker becomes more powerful, e.g., a larger β, then the trade-off
curve drops in the term of security at the same access delay. Nevertheless, the latency bounds in Section
V-B is still application, and can provide an estimation for the achievable performance of B-RAN.
Furthermore, Theorem 3 implies that latency and security can be balanced by adjusting the number
of confirmations N . The confirmation number N is a positive integer that can be chosen to achieve the
shortest latency under an acceptable security condition. Different from cryptocurrencies, wireless access
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Figure 15. The impact of the network size on the trade-off curves. (T b = 0.04, ρ = 0.7 and β = 0.2).
is much more sensitive to latency. Therefore, we usually should set a relative smaller N instead of the
typical six confirmations suggested in Bitcoin [22]. The specific value of N should be determined by the
latency requirement and also the security level.
It is worth noting that the network size can influence the trade-off. Fig. 15 demonstrates that, a more
expansive network with more access links s can significantly improve the network performance. Given
the security level β and traffic intensity ρ, B-RAN with a larger s has shorter service latency and allows
more confirmations. Fig. 15 indicates that, as B-RAN unites more subnetworks, it means more access
links s and higher value for B-RAN. This effect corresponds to the well-known positive network effect.
As more subnetworks join B-RAN, they make the B-RAN more valuable and a longer bandwagon.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we established an original framework to analytically characterize B-RAN properties and
performances. Based on the established queuing model, we analyzed the system latency of B-RAN and
evaluated the security level of B-RAN by considering the risk of alternative history attacks. We uncovered
an inherent latency and security relationship. We proposed to assess the achievable performance of B-
RAN according to the latency-security trade-off curve. We validated our analytical works by building
an in-house B-RAN prototype. The results derived from the model will provide meaningful insights and
guidelines for future B-RAN designs and implementations.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Assume that the mining rates and the difficulty remain constant. The probability of extending
honest chain by one block is 11+β , and the probability for an attacker to find the next block is
β
1+β .
Hence, the mining process can be described as a sequence of independent Bernoulli trials with the
probability of success 11+β . The attacker has to deliberately wait for N confirmations, i.e., to let the
benign chain continue to grow by N additional blocks. Meanwhile, the attacker can secretly produce Y
block in the fraudulent fork. We count the number of failures until N successes. As a result, the random
number of failures Y obeys a negative binomial distribution Y ∼ NB(N, 1/(1+β)) with the probability
mass function
Pr
{
Y = n;N,
1
1 + β
}
=
(
n+N − 1
n
)(
1
1 + β
)N ( β
1 + β
)n
.
Once N blocks are found by the honest network, in a period of time during which Y = n blocks are
found by the attacker. A race between honest miners and the attacker begins. As soon as the fraudulent
chain becomes longer than the benign chain, the attacker can publish the fraudulent chain to alter a
confirmed history. But, if the fraudulent chain is Ng (typically greater than N ) blocks behind the benign
chain, the attacker would give up. Let Pn = Pr {Win|z = n} be the probability that the attacker wins
before giving up, when starting from n blocks behind. Obviously, we have P−1 = 1 and PNg = 0. The
derivation of this recursion is simple. If the attacker finds the next block, the fraudulent chain is n − 1
blocks shorter than the benign chain and the probability of a successful attack becomes Pn−1. Similarly,
if the benign miners find a block, the attacker is n+1 blocks behind and the probability of a successful
attack becomes Pn+1. Applying the condition on the outcome of the first generated block, we have
Pn =
1
1 + β
Pn+1 +
β
1 + β
Pn−1, 0 ≤ n < Ng. (26)
Note that (26) comes differently from the equilibrium equations in Section IV. We further rewrite (26)
as
Pn−1 − Pn =
1
β
(Pn − Pn+1) , 0 ≤ n < Ng.
For n = Ng − 1, we have
PNg−2 − PNg−1 =
1
β
(
PNg−1 − PNg
)
=
1
β
PNg−1,
which, via recursive, yields
PNg−n−1 − PNg−n =
1
βn
PNg−1, 0 ≤ n < Ng.
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Hence,
PNg−n−1 = PNg−1 +
n∑
m=1
1
βm
PNg−1 =


PNg−1
1−1/βn+1
1−1/β , if β 6= 1
PNg−1 (n+ 1) , if β = 1.
Using the boundary condition that P−1 = 1 gives
PNg−1 =


1−1/β
1−1/βNg+1
if β 6= 1
1
Ng+1
if β = 1.
(27)
We thus obtain the expression of Pn as:
Pn =


βn+1−βNg+1
1−βNg+1
if β 6= 1 and 0 ≤ n < Ng
Ng−n
Ng+1
if β = 1 and 0 ≤ n < Ng
1 if n < 0
0 if n ≥ Ng.
(28)
Now assume that the benign chain extends N blocks and the fraudulent chain extends n blocks. The
attacker begins the race with N − n blocks behind. The probability of a successful alternative history
attack can be expressed as
S (N,β,Ng) =
∞∑
n=0
Pr {Win|z = N − n}Pr
{
Y = n;N,
1
1 + β
}
=
∞∑
n=0
(
n+N − 1
n
)(
1
1 + β
)N ( β
1 + β
)n
PN−n. (29)
We can arrange the terms in (29) by using the fact
∑
∞
n=0
(
n+N−1
n
) (
1
1+β
)N (
β
1+β
)n
= 1, and finally
obtain the result (24) in Theorem 2.
B. Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. The monotonicity of Ng can be easily obtained by observing the expression of S (N,β,Ng). As
Ng →∞, (28) in Appendix A becomes
lim
Ng→∞
Pn =


βn+1 if β < 1 and i > 0
1 otherwise.
As a direct result, we easily obtain S (N,β) = limNg→∞ S (N,β,Ng) in the limiting case from (24).
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